Leading Cases in California PI Law.

Overview

The landmark California cases that define personal injury law, from duty and breach through damages and bad faith, annotated with practical notes for injured people.

Negligence: Duty and Breach

Foundational Duty of Care

Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108

: Holding: Established the multi-factor balancing test for determining whether a duty of care exists. Abolished the common law distinctions among invitees, licensees, and trespassers for purposes of premises liability.

: Significance: The foundational case for duty analysis in California. Every duty question begins with Civil Code 1714(a) and the Rowland factors: foreseeability of harm, certainty of injury, connection between conduct and injury, moral blame, policy of preventing harm, burden on the defendant, consequences to the community, and insurance availability. See Duty of Care.

Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764

: Holding: Reaffirmed that the Rowland factors must be applied at a relatively broad level of factual generality, not case-by-case. A departure from the general duty of care under CC 1714 requires a showing that the policy considerations clearly support an exception.

: Significance: Strengthened the presumption of duty, making it more difficult for defendants to obtain duty-based summary judgment.

Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132

: Holding: Applied Rowland analysis to hold that employers and premises owners owe a duty of care to household members of workers exposed to asbestos (take-home exposure cases).

: Significance: Extended duty of care to third parties foreseeably harmed by toxic exposure, broadening premises and employer liability.

Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204

: Holding: A sports organization that sponsors and controls youth athletes has a special relationship giving rise to a duty to protect those athletes from sexual abuse by coaches.

: Significance: Expanded the scope of special-relationship duty in the context of youth sports and institutional abuse.

Negligence Per Se

Galvez v. Frields (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1410

: Holding: A violation of a statute, ordinance, or regulation that results in injury to a member of the class the statute was intended to protect creates a presumption of negligence.

: Significance: Confirms the application of Evidence Code 669 and CACI 418. Useful for Vehicle Code violations, building code violations, and health and safety code violations.

Millard v. Biosources, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1338

: Holding: Negligence per se applies when four elements are met: defendant violated a statute, the violation proximately caused the injury, the injury was of the type the statute was designed to prevent, and the plaintiff was in the class of persons the statute was designed to protect.

: Significance: Clear articulation of the four-element test for negligence per se, useful for jury instruction arguments.

Causation

Mitchell v. Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041

: Holding: Adopted the "substantial factor" test for causation, replacing the "but for" test in California negligence cases. A defendant's conduct is a cause of injury if it was a substantial factor in producing the harm.

: Significance: The governing causation standard in California. Reflected in CACI 430-431.

Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953

: Holding: In asbestos cases, the plaintiff must show that exposure to the defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing the injury. The substantial factor test does not require that the plaintiff prove the defendant's product was the sole or predominant cause.

: Significance: Key causation case in toxic exposure and products liability litigation. Applied broadly beyond asbestos cases.

Viner v. Sweet (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1232

: Holding: In legal malpractice cases, the plaintiff must prove causation under the "but for" test -- but for the attorney's negligence, the outcome would have been different.

: Significance: While specific to legal malpractice, illustrates that the substantial factor test is not universal -- different causes of action may apply different causation standards.

Comparative Fault

Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804

: Holding: Adopted pure comparative negligence in California, replacing the former contributory negligence bar. A plaintiff's recovery is reduced by their percentage of fault but not eliminated.

: Significance: One of the most important PI decisions in California history. Ensures that even significantly at-fault plaintiffs can still recover. See Comparative Fault.

American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578

: Holding: Established the doctrine of equitable comparative indemnity, allowing defendants to seek contribution from other tortfeasors based on relative fault. Also held that comparative fault principles apply to both negligence and strict liability.

: Significance: Enables cross-complaints for equitable indemnity among co-defendants and shapes multi-defendant litigation strategy.

Weidenfeller v. Star & Garter (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1

: Holding: Comparative fault principles apply to claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

: Significance: Confirms that comparative fault applies broadly across negligence theories.

Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296

: Holding: Established the distinction between primary and secondary assumption of risk. Primary assumption of risk is a complete bar (no duty); secondary assumption of risk is subsumed within comparative fault.

: Significance: Controls assumption-of-risk analysis in sports, recreation, and inherently risky activities. Primary assumption of risk eliminates duty entirely.

Products Liability

Strict Liability Foundations

Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57

: Holding: A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when it places a product on the market, knowing it will be used without inspection for defects, and the product proves to have a defect that causes injury.

: Significance: The landmark case establishing strict products liability in California. Foundation for all products liability claims. See Glossary -- Strict Liability.

Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 256

: Holding: Extended strict products liability to retailers and other entities in the chain of distribution, not just manufacturers.

: Significance: Allows plaintiffs to pursue strict liability claims against retailers, distributors, and component suppliers.

Design Defect

Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 413

: Holding: Established two alternative tests for design defect: (1) the consumer expectations test (whether the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect), and (2) the risk-benefit test (whether the risk of danger inherent in the design outweighs the benefits).

: Significance: The dual-test framework gives plaintiffs flexibility. The risk-benefit test shifts the burden to the defendant to show the benefits of the design outweigh the risks.

Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548

: Holding: Clarified when the consumer expectations test is available. The test applies only when the product's failure is within the common experience of ordinary consumers. Complex product failures require the risk-benefit test.

: Significance: Limits the consumer expectations test to simple products and failures. For complex products (vehicle crashworthiness, pharmaceutical side effects), the risk-benefit test governs.

Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 21

: Holding: The consumer expectations test may be applied when the circumstances of the product's failure are within the common experience of ordinary consumers, even if the underlying technology is complex.

: Significance: Clarified that the simplicity of the product failure, not the product itself, determines whether the consumer expectations test applies.

Failure to Warn

Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 987

: Holding: In strict liability failure-to-warn cases, the defendant's knowledge of the risk is relevant. A manufacturer is not strictly liable for failing to warn of risks that were not known or knowable at the time of distribution.

: Significance: Introduced a knowledge requirement into strict liability failure-to-warn claims, moving it closer to a negligence standard.

Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56

: Holding: The sophisticated intermediary doctrine may relieve a manufacturer of the duty to warn the end user when the manufacturer provides adequate warnings to a knowledgeable intermediary.

: Significance: Important defense in industrial and professional products cases where warnings are directed to trained intermediaries.

Component Parts and Successor Liability

O'Neil v. Crane Co. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 335

: Holding: A product manufacturer is not liable for harm caused by another manufacturer's product used with or attached to its product, unless the manufacturer's product contributed substantially to the harm.

: Significance: Limits the scope of component-part manufacturer liability and successor liability.

Ray v. Alad Corp. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 22

: Holding: A successor corporation may be strictly liable for defects in its predecessor's products under the "product line" exception to the general rule against successor liability.

: Significance: Ensures that corporate restructuring does not eliminate liability for defective products.

Damages

Compensatory Damages

Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 541

: Holding: A plaintiff's recoverable past medical damages are limited to the amounts actually paid or incurred by the plaintiff or their insurer, not the full amount billed by the provider.

: Significance: Fundamentally changed medical specials calculation in California PI. The gap between billed and paid amounts is not recoverable as economic damages. See Economic Damages.

Pebley v. Santa Clara Organics, LLC (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1266

: Holding: While Howell limits recoverable past medical damages to amounts paid, the plaintiff may still present evidence of the full billed amount to establish the reasonable value of medical services and to support the claim for future medical damages.

: Significance: Partially restored the plaintiff's ability to show the jury the full scope of medical treatment costs. Key companion case to Howell.

Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308

: Holding: Expert testimony on the reasonable value of medical services must be based on what was actually paid, not on full billed amounts, to comply with Howell.

: Significance: Restricts expert testimony on medical damages valuation to amounts consistent with Howell.

Bermudez v. Ciolek (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1311

: Holding: An uninsured plaintiff who has not paid their medical bills may recover the reasonable value of medical services received, which may exceed what an insurer would have paid.

: Significance: Addresses the gap in Howell for uninsured plaintiffs, allowing recovery based on reasonable value.

Non-Economic Damages

Pearl v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 475

: Holding: Affirmed a substantial non-economic damages award and discussed the standard for reviewing such awards on appeal (the award must shock the conscience or suggest passion or prejudice).

: Significance: Illustrates the high threshold for reducing non-economic damages on appeal.

Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines (1961) 56 Cal.2d 498

: Holding: The California Supreme Court upheld a substantial pain and suffering award, holding that damages for pain and suffering are inherently subjective and the jury has broad discretion.

: Significance: Foundational case supporting the jury's broad discretion in awarding non-economic damages.

Punitive Damages

Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1978) 21 Cal.3d 910

: Holding: Established that punitive damages in insurance bad faith cases must bear a reasonable relationship to the actual damages and are subject to meaningful judicial review.

: Significance: Foundational case for punitive damages review in insurance contexts.

Adams v. Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105

: Holding: The defendant's financial condition must be proven before a punitive damages award can be sustained. Without such evidence, the award cannot stand.

: Significance: Makes discovery of the defendant's financial condition essential in punitive damages cases. Establishes the foundation for financial condition discovery motions.

Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686

: Holding: Clarified the analysis for punitive damages, including the requirement that the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages generally should not exceed single digits, consistent with federal due process limits.

: Significance: Provides the framework for arguing and defending punitive damages amounts, incorporating the constitutional guardrails from BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore (1996) 517 U.S. 559 and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408.

Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 363

: Holding: Reduced punitive damages must be compared against the original compensatory damages award (not the reduced punitive amount) to assess proportionality under due process.

: Significance: Important procedural ruling on how courts analyze punitive damages ratios after remittitur.

Prejudgment Interest

Greathouse v. Amcord, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 831

: Holding: Prejudgment interest under CC 3291 is mandatory when a plaintiff's CCP 998 offer is rejected and the plaintiff obtains a more favorable judgment.

: Significance: Confirms that CC 3291 prejudgment interest is automatic and non-discretionary after a rejected 998 offer.

Medical Malpractice

Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (2016) 63 Cal.4th 75

: Holding: The MICRA statutes (including the one-year statute of limitations under CCP 340.5) apply only to claims based on "professional negligence" -- the negligent act or omission of a health care provider in rendering professional services.

: Significance: Not all injuries at a hospital are subject to MICRA. Ordinary negligence claims (slip and fall in the hospital, security failures) are governed by the standard two-year SOL.

Elam v. College Park Hospital (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 332

: Holding: A hospital may be held liable for negligently granting or failing to revoke staff privileges of an incompetent physician.

: Significance: Establishes independent institutional liability for hospitals beyond respondeat superior.

Lattimore v. Dickey (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 959

: Holding: A healthcare provider's failure to obtain informed consent may give rise to both a battery claim and a negligence claim, with different standards and different MICRA implications.

: Significance: Important distinction: battery (no consent at all) versus negligence (inadequate disclosure of risks).

Borrayo v. Avery (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 304

: Holding: The one-year MICRA statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that the injury was caused by wrongdoing, not when the plaintiff has confirmed medical evidence of malpractice.

: Significance: The discovery rule in medical malpractice requires only suspicion of wrongdoing, not certainty.

Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647

: Holding: A duty of care may extend to third parties foreseeably harmed by professional negligence, even absent privity of contract.

: Significance: Foundation for extending professional duty of care beyond the direct patient/client relationship.

Insurance Bad Faith

Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 566

: Holding: Recognized the tort of insurance bad faith -- an insurer's unreasonable failure to settle a claim or pay policy benefits gives rise to tort damages, not just contract damages.

: Significance: The foundational case for first-party insurance bad faith in California. Allows recovery of emotional distress and punitive damages beyond the policy limits.

Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 809

: Holding: An insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing is a non-delegable duty. The insurer must give at least as much consideration to the insured's interests as it gives to its own.

: Significance: Established the equal-consideration standard for claims handling.

Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 425

: Holding: An insurer that unreasonably refuses to settle a third-party claim within policy limits is liable for the full amount of the judgment, even if it exceeds the policy limits. The insured's emotional distress damages are also recoverable.

: Significance: The foundational case for third-party (excess liability) bad faith. Creates enormous leverage when policy limits are inadequate.

Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813

: Holding: An insured who prevails in a first-party bad faith action may recover attorney fees incurred in obtaining the policy benefits. These "Brandt fees" are treated as compensatory damages, not as an independent fee award.

: Significance: Permits recovery of attorney fees in bad faith cases, increasing the cost to insurers of wrongful claim denials.

Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287

: Holding: There is no private right of action under Insurance Code 790.03 (Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act). Bad faith claims must be pursued under common law tort theories.

: Significance: Eliminated direct private enforcement of the UCSPA, but the statute remains relevant as evidence of the standard of care for claims handling.

Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713

: Holding: An insurer's duty to accept a reasonable settlement demand within policy limits arises even before a lawsuit is filed. The insurer must consider the insured's interests when evaluating settlement.

: Significance: Pre-litigation bad faith exposure for insurers who unreasonably refuse to settle within limits.

Hogan v. Midland National Ins. Co. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 553

: Holding: Prejudgment interest is recoverable in bad faith actions, and the insurer's liability may include consequential damages flowing from the bad faith.

: Significance: Broadens the scope of recoverable damages in bad faith cases.

Reid v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 262

: Holding: An insurer that unreasonably delays UIM benefits may be liable for bad faith even if the claim is ultimately paid.

: Significance: Delay alone, without outright denial, can constitute bad faith.

Premises Liability

Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200

: Holding: A store owner has a duty to regularly inspect the premises and is charged with constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition if a reasonable inspection would have revealed it. A plaintiff may prove notice through evidence that the condition existed long enough that it should have been discovered.

: Significance: The leading case on constructive notice in slip-and-fall cases. Mode-of-operation and time-of-existence evidence are both relevant.

Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659

: Holding: Property owners have a duty to warn or protect against dangerous conditions on their property, even if the dangerous condition is open and obvious, unless the condition is so obvious that no reasonable person would encounter it.

: Significance: Limits the "open and obvious" defense in California premises liability cases.

Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205

: Holding: A landlord is not liable for a tenant's criminal act against a third party on the premises unless the landlord had a duty to protect against such criminal conduct (based on foreseeability and the Rowland factors).

: Significance: Addresses third-party criminal acts on leased premises and the scope of landlord duty.

Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149

: Holding: A landlord owes a duty of care to a tenant and third parties to maintain the leased premises in a reasonably safe condition, subject to the Rowland factors.

: Significance: Confirms that landlords have an ongoing duty of care that survives the lease.

Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611

: Holding: Property managers and management companies owe the same duty of care as property owners regarding dangerous conditions on the managed property.

: Significance: Extends premises liability to property management companies, adding another potentially liable defendant.

Peterson v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1185

: Holding: A commercial landlord may be liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition on leased premises if the landlord retained control over the area or had a duty to repair.

: Significance: Addresses the distinction between residential and commercial landlord duties.

Contreras v. Anderson (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 188

: Holding: A residential property owner may be liable for injuries caused by an uneven sidewalk abutting their property when the owner created the defect or exercised control over the sidewalk.

: Significance: Addresses the often-litigated issue of sidewalk liability between the property owner and the city.

Wrongful Death

Corder v. Corder (2007) 41 Cal.4th 644

: Holding: The wrongful death statute (CCP 377.60) limits standing to the decedent's heirs as defined by statute. Putative spouses may have standing if they meet the statutory requirements.

: Significance: Strictly interprets standing requirements. All potential heirs must be identified.

Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256

: Holding: In wrongful death cases involving elder abuse, the heightened remedies of the Elder Abuse Act (Welf. & Inst. Code 15657) apply, including attorney fees and survival damages for pre-death pain and suffering.

: Significance: Key intersection of wrongful death and elder abuse claims, providing enhanced remedies.

Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640

: Holding: Wrongful death damages include the pecuniary value of the decedent's life, loss of financial support, loss of love, companionship, comfort, affection, society, and moral support, as well as funeral and burial expenses. Loss of consortium-type damages are included.

: Significance: Comprehensive statement of wrongful death damages categories.

Ruttger Hotel Corp. v. Wagner (1981) 691 F.2d 957 (applying California law)

: Holding: Grief and sorrow of the surviving heirs are not recoverable in a wrongful death action. Only the pecuniary losses and loss-of-companionship damages are recoverable.

: Significance: Important limitation: grief damages are not available in wrongful death (though they may be available in a survival action for the decedent's pre-death suffering).

Elder Abuse

Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771

: Holding: To recover under the Elder Abuse Act, a plaintiff must prove "recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice" in the neglect of an elder -- a standard higher than mere professional negligence.

: Significance: The gatekeeping case for Elder Abuse Act claims. Simple negligence is insufficient; there must be a showing of recklessness or deliberate indifference.

Sababin v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 81

: Holding: The Elder Abuse Act's enhanced remedies (including attorney fees and independent survival damages) apply to claims against health care custodians who neglect or abuse elders.

: Significance: Confirms availability of enhanced remedies for institutional neglect.

Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396

: Holding: A staffing deficiency at a nursing home, when egregious enough, can constitute reckless neglect under the Elder Abuse Act rather than mere negligence.

: Significance: Provides a pathway for Elder Abuse Act claims based on systemic understaffing and resource deprivation.

Worsham v. O'Connor Hospital (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 331

: Holding: The Elder Abuse Act's "substantial caretaking or custodial relationship" requirement means the defendant must have assumed significant responsibility for the elder's basic needs.

: Significance: Limits Elder Abuse Act claims to defendants with a true custodial relationship, not merely casual or temporary contact.

Fenimore v. Regents of University of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1339

: Holding: A hospital may be subject to Elder Abuse Act liability when the hospital has assumed a custodial relationship with an elder patient and the patient is harmed through reckless neglect.

: Significance: Extended Elder Abuse Act liability to hospital settings beyond just skilled nursing facilities.

Government Liability

Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175

: Holding: Government entities are immune from liability under Government Code 815 except where a statute creates liability. Government Code 835 (dangerous condition of public property) is the primary statutory basis for liability.

: Significance: Reinforces the statutory-basis requirement for government tort claims.

Cordova v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1099

: Holding: A public entity may be liable under Government Code 835 for a dangerous condition of public property that combines a physical condition of the property with a third party's conduct.

: Significance: Allows claims based on design defects in public property even when a third party's conduct contributed to the injury.

de Villers v. County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 238

: Holding: The six-month government claim deadline under Government Code 911.2 is strictly enforced. Late claim relief under Government Code 911.4 is discretionary and not guaranteed.

: Significance: Underscores the critical importance of the six-month government claim deadline. Missing it can be fatal to the case.

Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection District (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798

: Holding: Addressed the scope of Government Code 850.4, which immunizes public entities from liability for failure to provide fire protection services. The immunity does not extend to injuries caused by an employee's negligent driving of a fire truck.

: Significance: Clarifies the limits of firefighting immunity and when government entities remain liable for employee negligence.

Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit District (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780

: Holding: A common carrier (including public transit) owes the highest degree of care to its passengers and is liable for even slight negligence.

: Significance: The heightened duty of care applicable to public transit agencies.

Emotional Distress

Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644

: Holding: Established strict requirements for bystander NIED claims: the plaintiff must be (1) closely related to the injury victim, (2) present at the scene of the injury-producing event, and (3) aware that the event is causing injury to the victim at the time it occurs.

: Significance: The controlling case for bystander emotional distress claims. All three elements must be met. "Closely related" is strictly interpreted.

Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064

: Holding: A direct victim of negligence (as opposed to a bystander) may recover for emotional distress without meeting the Thing requirements, so long as the defendant owed a duty of care directly to the plaintiff.

: Significance: The direct victim theory provides an alternative path for NIED claims when the plaintiff was the target of the defendant's negligence, not a bystander.

Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868

: Holding: The negligent handling of a corpse or cremated remains gives rise to a direct action for emotional distress by the decedent's close relatives.

: Significance: Recognized emotional distress claims in the specific context of funeral home and mortuary negligence.

Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916

: Holding: A person who is a direct victim of a doctor's negligent misdiagnosis may recover for emotional distress, even without physical injury. Rejected the requirement of physical impact for NIED claims.

: Significance: Eliminated the physical injury requirement for direct-victim NIED claims. The plaintiff need only show the defendant owed them a duty and that the negligence caused emotional distress.

Automobile Accidents

Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 976 (disapproved on other grounds)

: Holding: In a rear-end collision case, the rear driver is presumed negligent, and the burden shifts to the rear driver to rebut the presumption.

: Significance: Establishes the rebuttable presumption of negligence in rear-end collisions, simplifying liability in the most common type of auto accident case.

Rashtian v. BRAC-BH, Inc. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1847

: Holding: A bar or restaurant that serves alcohol to an obviously intoxicated minor may be liable for injuries caused by the minor's subsequent drunk driving.

: Significance: One of the narrow exceptions to California's general rule against social host and dram shop liability.

Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764

: Holding: A truck driver and their employer owe a duty of care to other motorists regarding the safe operation and maintenance of commercial vehicles.

: Significance: Applied in trucking accident cases to establish the duty of commercial motor carriers.

CCP 998 Offers to Compromise

Wear v. Calderon (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 818

: Holding: A CCP 998 offer must be sufficiently specific to allow the offeree to evaluate it. An ambiguous or conditional offer is invalid.

: Significance: Establishes the specificity requirement for valid 998 offers. Draft offers carefully.

Pineda v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 53

: Holding: A valid CCP 998 offer must be unconditional and for a sum certain.

: Significance: Reinforces that conditional or vague 998 offers are unenforceable.

Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258

: Holding: CCP 998 expert witness fee-shifting applies only to expert fees incurred after the date of the rejected offer.

: Significance: Limits the scope of cost-shifting to post-offer expert fees.

Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276

: Holding: CCP 998 cost-shifting applies even when the plaintiff obtains a plaintiff's verdict, if the verdict is less than the defendant's 998 offer.

: Significance: Confirms that 998 fee-shifting is based on the comparison between the offer and the judgment, regardless of who "wins."

Good Faith Settlement

Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488

: Holding: Established the factors for determining whether a settlement is in "good faith" under CCP 877.6: the rough approximation of the settling defendant's proportionate share of liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds, financial conditions of the settling defendant, whether the remaining defendants would be prejudiced, and any evidence of collusion or tortious conduct.

: Significance: The controlling framework for good faith settlement motions. Frequently litigated in multi-defendant cases.

Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 858

: Holding: A good faith settlement determination bars claims for equitable indemnity and contribution by non-settling defendants against the settling defendant.

: Significance: The bar order is a powerful incentive for early settlement. Once obtained, the settling defendant is fully protected from cross-claims.

Vicarious Liability and Respondeat Superior

Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 956

: Holding: An employer is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees committed within the scope of employment. An employee is acting within the scope of employment when performing work incidental to the duties assigned to them.

: Significance: The modern foundation for respondeat superior liability in California.

Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202

: Holding: An employer may be vicariously liable for an employee's intentional torts (including sexual assault) when the tort was committed within the scope of employment or was engendered by the employment.

: Significance: Extended respondeat superior to intentional torts in certain circumstances, particularly where the employment provided the opportunity and authority for the wrongful act.

Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291

: Holding: Employer vicarious liability requires that the employee's tortious conduct be engendered by or arise from the employment. A required causal nexus must exist between the employment and the tort.

: Significance: Limits respondeat superior to situations with a genuine employment nexus, preventing unlimited employer liability for all employee acts.

Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148

: Holding: Under Vehicle Code 17150, the owner of a vehicle is liable for the negligent operation of the vehicle by any person using it with the owner's express or implied permission.

: Significance: Statutory owner liability supplements respondeat superior when the driver is not an employee.

Collateral Source and Medical Specials

Hanif v. Housing Authority (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 635

: Holding: A plaintiff's recovery for medical expenses is limited to the amount actually paid by Medicare, MediCal, or other public benefit programs, regardless of the full billed amount.

: Significance: Predecessor to Howell for public-benefit medical expenses. Establishes that the measure of damages is the amount paid, not the amount billed.

Nishihama v. City and County of San Francisco (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 298

: Holding: Applied Hanif to limit a plaintiff's recoverable medical damages to the amount actually paid by the insurer or public program.

: Significance: Extended the Hanif rule to private insurance contexts, foreshadowing the Howell decision.

Katiuzhinsky v. Perry (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1185

: Holding: Medical expenses paid by an employer's self-funded ERISA plan are subject to the collateral source rule analysis.

: Significance: Addresses the intersection of ERISA lien rights and California's collateral source rule.

Assumption of Risk

Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296

: Holding: Established the distinction between primary assumption of risk (no duty owed -- complete bar to recovery) and secondary assumption of risk (subsumed into comparative fault under Li v. Yellow Cab).

: Significance: The controlling framework. Primary assumption of risk eliminates the duty element; secondary assumption of risk is simply a comparative fault factor. See Comparative Fault.

Cheong v. Antablin (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1063

: Holding: Participants in recreational activities assume the risk of injuries inherent in the activity. A co-participant has no duty to reduce the inherent risks of the sport.

: Significance: Applied primary assumption of risk to co-participant sports injuries. A co-participant is liable only for intentional or reckless conduct.

Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482

: Holding: A golfer owes no duty of care to other golfers for injuries arising from an errant golf shot during the normal course of play.

: Significance: Applied primary assumption of risk to golf, illustrating how the doctrine works in common recreational activities.

Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1148

: Holding: Primary assumption of risk may apply to injuries on amusement park rides when the risk is inherent in the activity and cannot be eliminated without altering the nature of the activity.

: Significance: Extended primary assumption of risk beyond traditional sports to commercial recreational activities.

Discovery and Procedure

Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367

: Holding: A plaintiff's entire medical and psychological history is not automatically discoverable. Discovery must be limited to conditions relevant to the claimed injuries.

: Significance: Protects plaintiffs from overly broad medical history fishing expeditions. Only records related to claimed injuries or relevant pre-existing conditions are discoverable.

Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844

: Holding: A party does not waive their right to privacy merely by filing a lawsuit. The scope of discovery into private matters must be balanced against the party's privacy interests.

: Significance: Foundational case for resisting overbroad privacy-invading discovery, including social media discovery requests.

Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 298

: Holding: Addressed class action discovery issues in the context of food labeling cases.

: Significance: While primarily a class action case, provides guidance on the scope of discovery in consumer protection cases that overlap with PI.

Statute of Limitations and Tolling

Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103

: Holding: Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that the injury was caused by wrongdoing. The plaintiff need not know the specific cause or the identity of the wrongdoer.

: Significance: The controlling case on when the discovery rule triggers the SOL. "Suspicion" is a lower bar than certainty.

Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926

: Holding: The "discovery rule" delays accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.

: Significance: Applies the discovery rule broadly, including to fraud, concealment, and professional negligence claims.

Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797

: Holding: The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the discovery rule applies to toll the statute of limitations.

: Significance: The plaintiff must affirmatively prove they could not have discovered the claim earlier.

Miscellaneous Important Cases

Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689

: Holding: A hiring party is generally not liable for injuries to an independent contractor's employees resulting from the contractor's negligence in performing the contracted work (the Privette doctrine).

: Significance: Limits the liability of hiring parties (general contractors, property owners) for injuries to independent contractors' workers. Subject to exceptions for retained control and concealed hazards.

Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198

: Holding: The Privette doctrine does not shield a hiring party that retains control over the contracted work and exercises that control in a manner that affirmatively contributes to the injury.

: Significance: The retained-control exception to Privette. If the hiring party directed or controlled the method of the work that caused the injury, they may be liable.

Reeves v. Hanlon (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1140

: Holding: Addressed the intentional interference with prospective economic advantage in a business context.

: Significance: While not a traditional PI case, this holding is relevant when PI firms encounter tortious interference with their client relationships.

Peredia v. HR Mobile Services, Inc. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 680

: Holding: A person driving a company vehicle within the scope of employment may create vicarious liability for the employer under both respondeat superior and Vehicle Code 17150.

: Significance: Confirmed dual bases of employer liability in vehicle accident cases.

Related Pages

• Key California Statutes -- The statutory provisions these cases interpret
• Legal Glossary -- Definitions for legal terms used in these holdings
• Duty of Care -- Analysis of the Rowland framework
• Comparative Fault -- Li v. Yellow Cab and apportionment
• Economic Damages -- Howell/Pebley framework for medical specials
• Practice Checklists -- Procedures incorporating these legal standards

Cross-References

• Legal Glossary
• Key California Statutes
• Practice Checklists
• Trial Practice
• Evidence Rules
• Jury Instructions

Common Questions

Sources & Legal Citations

1. Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108. Modern duty of care framework; eliminated invitee/licensee/trespasser categories.
2. Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804. Adopted pure comparative negligence in California.
3. Howell v. Hamilton Meats (2011) 52 Cal.4th 541. Medical damages limited to amounts actually paid or incurred.
4. Sargon Enterprises v. USC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747. Judicial gatekeeping standard for expert testimony.
5. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57. Established strict liability for defective products.
6. Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 425. Insurer bad faith for failing to accept reasonable settlement demand.